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Our lives intertwine with praise and blame in ways both simple and complex. 
If you ask me to pick up your child after work, and I fail to do so even after 
promising that I would, you will very likely be angry at me. This is not the 
irritation we experience when the weather is chilly or when we don’t win the 
lottery. This attitude is directed at a specific person, ordinarily a (somewhat) aware 
and responsive being. That is, you are presuming that I am a particular kind of 
entity, a responsive, choice-making agent. It is partly in virtue of this fact that your 
reaction of irritation has its distinctive flavor; unlike bad weather or unreliable 
lottery drawings, I can knowingly and willingly bind myself with commitments 
that we both take to license blaming when I fail to live up to them. In short, I 
am a special kind of entity—a responsible agent. In virtue of my conduct, I can 
be worthy of praise and blame.
 These moralized reactions are not limited to interpersonal relationships. 
People spend years in prison, beyond what is plausibly useful for rehabilitation, 
and usually to the exclusion of victim restitution, out of an oftentimes inchoate 
or implicit conviction that criminals deserve punishment in light of their culpable 
failure to exercise their agency in the right ways. Indeed, it is difficult to make 
sense of the impulse to execute criminals without appeal to some notion of 
deservingness bound up in the idea that the criminal is morally responsible for 
his crime in some deep way. So, moral responsibility, the idea of praiseworthiness, 
blameworthiness, and associated notions of merit are all important parts of our 
shared lives.
 This picture, however, is threatened by a very familiar chain of reasoning. 
The reasoning goes like this: if everything is caused, no one is genuinely free, and 
thus, no one can be genuinely morally responsible for anything. It is a very old 
argument.1 Versions of it have been banging around in the Western intellectual 
tradition for millennia, and every age has its favorite formulation of it. Perhaps 
the most common contemporary incarnation of the argument frames things in 
terms of a threat from science. You don’t have to look very hard to find people 
who will say, for example, that neuroscience or biology or scientific psychology has 
shown that we are not beings that act independent of the causal, physical order.2 
We are told that modern science has sufficiently mapped out the underlying 
psychological, biological, or chemical roots of our behavior so that we can say 
with confidence that free will does not exist. Consequently, all those notions 
we associate with free will—ideas of praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, and 
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merit—are in trouble as well. So we are told.
 It is easy to overstate the conclusion of the familiar chain of reasoning. 
It does not claim that we make no difference to what happens. At least some 
of what happens does so precisely in virtue of our participation in the causal 
sequence. One’s sordid extramarital affair does not happen without the causal 
chain working through one’s body parts. The point of the argument is that one 
should not be blamed for what one does, because it is part of an inexorable 
causal chain extending back in time prior to the existence of any humans. This 
chain of reasoning also does not claim that we must let all the criminals go. We 
would still have practical reasons to separate incorrigible cases from the rest of 
us.3 However, our treatment of criminals might seem closer to quarantine and 
rehabilitation than punishment in any conventional sense.
 Still, the ramifications of the familiar argument are significant. They are 
significant enough that accepting them may require a steely backbone, one might 
think. At any rate, this is surely part of the reason why the familiar chain of 
reasoning is oftentimes presented in something of a macho, gruff tone, claiming 
the authority of science.
 The gruff tone can be important. It is, I think, intended to convey the 
conviction that only someone with a weakness for namby-pamby, feel-good myths 
about humanity’s special place in the world would resist the conclusion of the 
familiar chain of argument.4 Do not let the gruff tone mislead about the state of 
scientific and philosophical inquiry into the subject matter. There is plenty of 
sincere, thoughtful disagreement about both empirical and philosophical matters. 
The conceptual and empirical issues tied to free will are very, very difficult, and 
we are unlikely to get informed consensus about them any time soon. Moreover, 
the basic issues extend beyond any particular scholar’s domain of expertise: there 
is the scientific bit, sure, but there is also the moral bit and the matter of our 
concepts what we mean, what they are committed to, and whether they permit of 
transformation or rehabilitation in the face of an uncooperative world. Having 
decisive reasons to think something in any of these domains does little to settle 
the matter in the other domains. In sum, we do well to be suspicious of any 
sweeping claims that imply a special authority on the part of the claimant.
 My aim here is to focus on only one part of the familiar chain of argument.5 
I wish to focus on the nature of moral responsibility, bracketing larger issues 
concerning free will. On the matter of moral responsibility, I think we can make 
a kind of progress by asking what’s at stake when we ascribe moral responsibility. 
What does keeping track of it allow us to do? Is there anything that might make 
sense of these practices, independent of whatever else turns out to be true of 
free will and the causal order? My idea is this: if we have a plausible account of 
the structure and nature of moral responsibility, we can describe powers and 
purposes that make sense of our practices, more or less as we find them. My 
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aim here is to sketch how that story might go, and thus, to offer some reason 
for thinking that the familiar chain of reasoning does not go through. To put 
it bluntly, there is good reason to think we are morally responsible even if we 
accept a broadly scientific worldview. The trick is to be clear about the kind 
of thing responsibility must be. Once we are clear about this, the threats from 
determinism, reductionism, and the like subside.
2. Terms and assumptions
Philosophy is hard enough without the murkiness that comes from failing to clarify 
one’s terms and presuppositions. So, I’ll start by defining a few key ideas. “Moral 
responsibility” is obviously an important term here, and one I’ll be using in a 
somewhat specialized way. We sometimes use the word to pick out obligations, as 
in “you failed to meet your responsibilities.” I’m not using it in the sense where 
it is a synonym for “obligations.” Instead, I’m using it to pick out the property 
of, roughly, being morally praiseworthy or morally blameworthy.
 (I say “roughly” because what is at stake is actually a fairly large set of 
characteristic practices, attitudes, and judgments, of which conclusions of 
worthiness of praise and blame are only a part; the fuller story would involve 
reactions including indignation and gratitude, outrage and envy, and behaviors 
from avoidance to congratulations. These latter things can include more than 
what we sometimes think of as praise and blame in the narrow sense. They are, I 
think, broader than the canonical “reactive attitudes” detailed by P.F. Strawson.6)
 It is important to notice that the notion of responsibility I am interested in 
is distinct from, for example, legal or causal notions of responsibility. Indeed, 
a remarkable feature of moral responsibility is its seemingly person-centric 
focus. A hurricane might be causally responsible for flattening a trailer park, 
but it is not morally responsible for having done so. And, within the realm of 
interpersonal assessments of responsibility, moral responsibility need not entail 
legal responsibility. We might think a person is blameworthy for failing to provide 
a sympathetic ear to a distressed friend, but it does not follow that the bad friend 
has broken any laws.
 One word I’ll be throwing around a bit is agent. By “agent” I mean to pick out 
entities that are capable of acting, or undertaking courses of intentional action. 
These are beings that paradigmatically act on the basis of beliefs, desires, and 
intentions. So, you are an agent. I am an agent. Your cat is probably an agent. 
Hurricanes are not agents, and neither are subatomic particles or single-celled 
organisms.
 Finally, I’ll be helping myself to some assumptions that I won’t try to defend 
here, but that will be operating in the background of what follows.
4
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Continuity with nature: We are continuous with and a part of 
the larger natural world, and are ultimately material or physical 
beings. The presumption that we are part of the rest of the 
natural order is also a presumption against appeals to souls, 
ectoplasmic substances, radical independence from the causal 
order, or other spooky properties ... unless one musters a really, 
really good story.
The viability of moral discourse:
(A) Morality talk is not like talk of unicorns or phlogiston; 
that is, there is something in the world that we are usefully 
and rightly getting at when we talk of morality (what, exactly, 
that comes to I want to leave open).
(B) Moreover, for language or thought to be moral it need not 
rely on high-blown language. If you think I’m a jerk because 
I’m insensitive, that’s a piece of moralized thinking—at least 
to the extent to which you think people ought not be jerks 
or ought not conduct themselves in jerk-like ways. Moral 
vocabulary shifts over time, and much of our interpersonal 
judgments are moralized. You and I tend to think there are 
better and worse ways to be, better and worse ways to act, 
and that one, all things considered, ought to act in the better 
ways relative to the available choices. When we condemn 
or praise people in light of those standards, we are typically 
expressing moralized judgments.
With the main terms and assumptions clarified, we can now start to push forward. 
I’ll begin by saying a bit about what I mean when I talk of “the work” of our 
concept of moral responsibility. Then, I’ll articulate some options available to 
us, and I’ll go on to motivate the picture I favor.
3. What’s the work of our concept of moral responsibility?
We use concepts to carve up and categorize parts of the world. Concepts do a 
kind of work for us: they may demarcate one thing from another. Relatedly, they 
identify a collection of (we suppose) interrelated inferences we can make about 
things. So, for example, the concept of ‘car’ does the work of capturing a subset 
of transportation-related thoughts we have: a car is likely to have a motor, it is 
likely to travel on wheels, it is likely to be used as transportation for small groups 
of people on paved surface streets, and so on. The work of the concept of ‘llama’ 
is to specify a cluster of inferences regarding a particular kind of mammal in the 
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world; the work of the concept of ‘felony’ is to specify a set of inferences regarding 
a legal status; the work of ‘touchdown’ is to specify a set of inferences regarding 
a scoring event internal to the game of American football. We can say that the 
work of a concept is defined by its primary, general inferential role.
 Nothing in this picture requires that all concepts necessarily do an identifiable 
piece of work for us. Perhaps there are concepts that do not have any practical 
or inferential role in our thinking or practices. Nor does this picture presume 
that the work of a concept is univocal. Indeed, some concepts are very highly 
contested, subject to substantially different individual conceptions of what 
counts as the principal work of the concept. We might think of the concept 
of marriage as regulating, for example, (1) a legally sanctioned and privileged 
relationship, (2) a religious sacramental relationship, (3) a property relationship, 
(4) a privileged emotional relationship, or (5) conditions of socially sanctioned 
sexual intercourse. If the conceptual work of ‘marriage’ is different for you than it 
is for your neighbors, you are likely to disagree with them about the propriety of 
different ways of extending the concept. Much of the recent dispute concerning 
gay marriage in the U.S. is rooted in disagreements about the work of the concept 
of marriage. One’s conception of the work of the concept plays a big part in the 
ways in which one is willing to think a novel proposed usage is an apt one. So, 
disagreement about the work of a concept is both possible and sometimes actual.
 Finally, the fact of a concept having a role does not guarantee that the concept 
as we have it or use it does a good job of fulfilling that role. The ancient concept 
of “blood purity” might have been like this. Presumably, the work of the concept 
as its users conceived of it was to demarcate real differences in human kinds, tied 
principally to lines of inheritance. The concept failed to do its work in two ways. 
First, there was nothing in the world that neatly corresponded to blood purity as 
it was ordinarily conceived. Second, what work the concept did in practice fell 
considerably short of the role that it was generally understood to have: rather 
than tracking real, essential purity of a blood line, it tracked various contingent 
social and class differences. So, the work of a particular concept might not be 
well executed by the concepts we have: the concept could be defective and the 
world might not cooperate.7
 Despite the inevitably abstract talk of conceptual work, these ideas allow us to 
make sense of the notion that it can be useful to ask about the conceptual role of 
moral responsibility. As a first pass, I’d say that the work of the concept of moral 
responsibility has to do with marking a set of inferences about differential moral 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. People who knowingly and intentionally 
do the wrong thing deserve condemnation. People who do the right thing deserve 
approval. Keeping track of when people deserve praise and blame is the work of 
the concept of moral responsibility. It is, in some sense, why we rightly have a 
concept of moral responsibility.
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 (To clarify: this is not a historical claim. It is a claim about why, whatever its 
history, we now are right to have such a concept.)
 Given this picture, one where the work of the concept is tied to differential 
assessments of praise- and blameworthiness, the challenge for us is to consider 
whether there are any good reasons to suppose that people can be worthy of praise 
and blame. At this point, the temptation may be to return to familiar issues of 
free will. But let us postpone those concerns for a moment. Instead, let us ask 
why we should care about praise and blame. My thought is this: if we know what 
work the concept does (and I think we do), and we have some grasp on why we 
should care about the work that it does, this gives us a vantage point from which 
to pick and choose among various candidate accounts of the conditions of moral 
responsibility. To do this, it helps to know some more about the thing in the 
world we are trying to track. What is this blameworthiness stuff, anyway?
4. First pass at responsibility-as-blameworthiness
I have suggested that one way to understand the relevant sense of moral 
responsibility is in terms of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. To get some 
sense of what we are after, it may be helpful to begin with a philosophically reviled 
account of blameworthiness: the classical consequentialist account of moral 
responsibility. An idea fundamental to the classical consequentialist account 
was that praise gets us to do good things and blame gets us to avoid doing bad 
things. So, we have reason to care about moral responsibility inasmuch as we 
care about getting people to behave in the right ways and getting them to avoid 
behaving in the wrong ways. On this picture, then, to be blameworthy is just for 
it to be the case that, given that you did something wrong, were I to blame you, 
it would lead you to behave in the right ways.8
 In its classical form, there are a number of important problems for this 
account. For example, it seems to do a bad job of explaining lots of ordinary 
cases where we are making judgments of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. 
In many cases, we are making judgments that look like they have no hope of 
influencing anyone, both as a matter of what I might believe and as a matter of 
what is actually possible, apart from my beliefs. If I admiringly praise a dead relative 
for her dedication to the fight against the now-extinct disease of kuru9, I need 
not presume to be influencing that relative. Influencing the dead is, I suspect, 
substantially beyond my limited powers of persuasion.10 It is also implausible to 
suppose that my judgment is an attempt to influence, for example, myself, or my 
acquaintances, to fight kuru. Kuru seems to have become extinct a few decades 
back. I suppose we could imagine that I might be motivated to praise my dead 
relative for her fight against kuru as part of an elaborate attempt to get me or 
people I know to fight diseases in general, or even to just dedicate some part of 
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our lives to a worthwhile cause. But this certainly doesn’t seem necessary for me 
to make the judgment that my relative was praiseworthy for her endeavors. Yet, 
the classical consequentialist story seems to require that my particular praising 
or blaming have these effects in this particular case for us to rightly care about 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. So, whatever it is that we are tracking 
with our concept of moral responsibility, it looks like the classical consequentialist 
story misses the mark.
 A more promising account holds that what we are looking for isn’t susceptibility 
to praise and blame, but rather, a kind of relationship between agents and what 
moral reasons there are. Roughly speaking, if you are doing a good job responding 
to moral reasons, you are praiseworthy. If you are doing a bad job of responding 
to them, you are blameworthy.
 That’s all a bit compressed. I’ve said that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness 
are a kind of relationship to reasons. As we will see, though, that relationship is 
deceptively complex. To see how, we need to unpack some ideas implicit in our 
judgments of blameworthiness, for they specify some aspects of that relationship 
that, while simple enough to state, pick out complex features of the world. (I’ll 
focus on the blameworthiness case, but I think much of the basic picture can be 
extended to praiseworthiness).
 Thoughts like “Joe is blameworthy” are comparatively minimal in their explicit 
conceptual commitments. There are essentially two ideas at work in this sort of 
thought: that the person we are responding to is a being of the right sort to regard 
in responsibility-assessing ways (what I will call a responsible agent) and that he or 
she has met, exceeded, or violated some norm that we regard as justified. For each 
of these subsidiary judgments to be true or justified, well, that’s the part that can 
be convoluted. But notice this basic situation is not unique to our thoughts about 
moral responsibility. There are plenty of judgments we make in everyday life that 
have the structure of being on the one hand cognitively minimal, (in terms of what 
you must suppose to coherently entertain the thought), and on the other hand, 
pretty robust in terms of what features the world must have for the thought to turn 
out to be true. The thought that I married the right person is pretty conceptually 
thin—something like “this particular person to whom I am married to is a sufficiently 
good fit for me in all the ways that matter.” (We could nitpick about whether “the 
right person” indicates that there can be only one person or whether it instead 
is an implicit notion of sufficiency of rightness, but let’s leave this to the side.) 
What would make this thought that “I’ve married the right person” true, though, 
is presumably a pretty complex set of facts about the people involved. These facts 
might include such things as compatibility of personality, values, aspirations, and 
the like, but also a means of communication, and facts about the existence of 
marriage practices and the permissibility of such practices.11
Let’s return to judgments of blameworthiness. Such judgments seem to be 
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frequently backward-looking but cognitively thin. Saying what needs to hold 
for the judgment to be true thus requires theories of two things: (1) the nature 
of responsible agency, and (2) the nature of the responsibility norms. I’ll take 
them in order.
5. Reasons responsiveness
Before sketching a theory of responsible agency, I want to say a bit about reasons 
and what responsiveness to them can consist in.12
 A reason is, roughly, a consideration that counts in favor of something. And, 
I take it, a core feature of our self-conception is that we do things for reasons. We 
don’t always act for good reasons. And, surely, there are often reasons for us to do 
things of which we are blissfully unaware. And, sometimes, we end up acting for 
reasons that we cannot articulate, or of which we may be systematically unaware. 
Nevertheless, in a wide range of cases we are concerned to act for reasons.
 I don’t want to suppose an overly intellectualistic conception of reasons. 
Reasons might well depend to a very large degree on our emotions, preferences, 
or desires. Nothing about this picture is meant to preclude the possibility that 
reasons are ultimately dependent on aims or affect. For present purposes, I just 
want to help myself to the idea that we can usefully talk of reasons, and that the 
utility of talking this way emerges ubiquitously, for even comparatively rudimentary 
systems.
 So, for example, the presence of a nut in the waning days of autumn usually 
generates a reason for a squirrel to figure out a way to get that nut safely to his 
or her den. All that is required is the idea that it makes sense to speak of a 
squirrel having aims and that there are features of the world that are relevant to 
the attainment of those aims. Indeed, these very features seem quite plausibly 
present in entirely simulated worlds. We might imagine a video game in which 
there are computer-controlled characters that have reasons to respond to their 
artificial environments in various ways. A computer-controlled character that is, 
for example, hunting for dangerous aliens will have a reason to proceed cautiously 
when there is evidence of aliens in that artificial environment. The lesson is 
pretty simple: to believe that there are reasons, all we need to think is that there 
can be things relevant to an agent’s aims.
 Note, though, that agents can have variable sensitivity to reasons. We might 
imagine that some computer-controlled characters are more and less able to 
recognize evidence in their artificial world (if you don’t play video games, just 
trust me on this). And, similarly, we might imagine that some squirrels are better 
than others at recognizing that there are acorns out there.
 But the success of our simulated agent or our imagined squirrels doesn’t just 
depend on recognitional capacities. Success also depends on the agent acting on 
9
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that information in the right way, which is something we might call a volitional 
capacity, or a capacity for self-governance. A squirrel that is an excellent acorn-
detector but acorn-phobic will do badly at the business of acorn collection. So 
will a squirrel that is excellent at detecting acorns but completely apathetic about 
pursuing them. So, the ability to recognize reasons for action is of limited utility 
by itself—it is absolutely crucial that it be connected to a further ability to act 
on the detected information in the right way. At least from the philosophical 
armchair, there is no reason to suppose that excellence in reason detection is 
necessarily coupled with excellence in being appropriately moved. I know I have 
good reason to go for a run later today. I also know I won’t do it.
 This is a relatively simple picture, relying on two key ideas: recognition of 
reasons and implementing a suitable course of action in light of the significance 
that reason has for the agent. Things are, of course, much more complicated in 
the real world. For example, agents find themselves infested with desires, values, 
and interests that can operate at cross-purposes in the near and long terms. Acorn 
hoarding is less important if a predator is around. And, indeed, the environment 
interacts with our complex recognitional, deliberative, and volitional systems in 
a multitude of ways.
 For example, I might normally be substantially resistant to having a third 
shot of tequila, viewing it as a bad idea—at least until I’ve had something to eat. 
When my brother comes into the room, though, the difficulty of resisting that 
temptation goes up. (Perhaps he makes drinking even more fun; perhaps his 
enthusiasm for tequila is contagious; perhaps I simply need to be liquored up 
to get along with family—imagine any scenario you like.) Suddenly, having that 
third shot, maybe even a fourth shot, doesn’t seem so unreasonable. And note 
what is happening—my ability to resist the temptation can change in light of two 
different forces, both originating from that single change in the situation. First, 
any brute desire to have a shot can go up, or alternately, where there was no 
desire for a shot there now is such a desire. So, the configuration of my desires 
might change, making it harder to resist temptation. But second, and perhaps 
more nefariously, the change in environment can hijack my evaluation of what 
counts as a good idea. That is, not only might I want the shot more, my sense of 
what counts as a good idea, including my ability to attend to reasons of tequila 
moderation, might have changed. Note further that this change can be independent 
or dependent on changes in my desires. That is, my sense of what constitutes a 
good idea might change precisely because the force of new, pro-tequila desires 
overwhelms my evaluations. But, even if those desires stay stable, my evaluations 
might nevertheless change in light of the change in situation.
 Now in the case I’ve just described, I’m pretty conscious of the phenomenon 
of sibling-triggered enthusiasm for tequila. But it isn’t hard to imagine parallel 
cases in which we are not conscious of the ways in which the environment changes 
10
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our volitional powers, making it harder (or easier) to translate recognition of 
some reason into the right sort of behavior. Notice what this means, though: our 
volitional capacity, the capacity to move ourselves to act in accord with a reason 
we recognize, in some sense doesn’t just depend on us. It also depends on the 
context or circumstances of action. There is a relatively straightforward way in 
which it makes sense to think that at least some of our ordinarily understood 
agential capacities depend on the world for their powers.13
 This is, I think, an important point that has been for too long underappreciated 
by philosophers who think about agency. We have tended to focus almost 
exclusively in understanding agents in relative isolation from the environments 
in which we act, to commit ourselves to an implausible form of methodological 
individualism. By this I mean that the powers of agents are almost always presented 
and discussed in a way that makes it seem as though if we wish to understand 
what capacities any given agent has, all we need to know are facts about the 
agent. The circumstances of action only matter as inputs on fixed capacities. In 
contrast, the picture I’m suggesting is one where our capacities themselves are 
somewhat malleable, subject to situational pressures that we would do well to 
understand and incorporate in our accounts of agency.
What we have, then, are three ideas: the capacity to recognize reasons, a 
corresponding capacity for self-governance in light of those reasons, and the idea of 
context-dependence in at least some of our capacities. I now want to add a fourth 
idea to the mix, the idea that we can differentiate between varieties of reasons.
There are, for example, prudential reasons. These are reasons whose significance 
depends solely on what is of benefit to the agent. So, for example, it would be 
prudent for me to not bore you, and it would be prudent for me to end on time, 
or even to end early. It would be wildly imprudent to fail to give this talk at all. 
So, there are reasons of prudence. But there are also reasons of other varieties. 
There are presumably legal reasons, that is, considerations grounded in various 
aspects of the law. And, there are presumably aesthetic reasons, or considerations 
that count in favor of one or another artistic choice. These reasons would be 
indexed to whatever it is that gives rise to aesthetic properties, which might include 
things such as visual, tonal, or linguistic properties, but also artistic traditions, 
personal preferences, or the collective sensibilities about what is new, worthwhile, 
or recognizably norm-breaking. It is plausible that there are also moral reasons. 
For people of a particular generation, this may sound odd. We sometimes regard 
explicit talk about morality with skepticism or the sort of raised eyebrows we save 
for public expressions of wild-eyed religiosity. But all I mean by talk of moral 
reasons are those reasons whose significance depends on morality, whatever that 
comes to. So, for example, if morality is purely conventional, then moral reasons 
will depend on conventions. If, on the other hand, morality depends on, say, the 
will of God, or the compatibility of an agent’s intentions with the categorical 
11
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imperative, or the issuances of an ideal observer, then moral reasons will depend 
on that. The details are not, for present purposes, important.
 What is important, though, is that there can be moral reasons, and that 
agents can vary in their abilities to recognize such reasons and to respond to 
them accordingly. The variation operates along several dimensions, including 
recognitional and volitional sensitivity, but also in terms of how these things 
operate across contexts. And, of course, these variations hold across particular 
agents. This should not be surprising. We all know people who are incredibly 
responsive to the suffering of others, highly polished at avoiding chagrin-inducing 
social interactions, or particularly skilled at providing good cheer to those in 
need. And of course, we also know people who seem perhaps pathologically 
insensitive to the needs of others, blind to what gives offense, and immune to 
suggestions that they better regulate their behavior around others. We call these 
latter people professors. The point, though, is that people have varied capacities 
for recognizing and responding to moral reasons, and that the capacities vary 
across individuals and circumstances.
 So, we’ve got four ideas on the table connected to the role of reasons and 
agents: (1) a capacity to recognize reasons, (2) a capacity to respond in appropriate 
ways to reasons, (3) the situation-dependence of those capacities, and (4) the 
possibility of moral reasons and the idea that people can be better and worse 
at responding to such reasons. I now want to sketch a way to build a promising 
account of responsibility out of these four ideas.
 Putting all these pieces together, we can say the capacities of responsiveness 
to moral reasons are what matter for moral responsibility. It is their presence or 
absence that—in conjunction with some other things14—underwrites the propriety 
of moralized praising and blaming. These capacities do not operate in isolation 
from the world. They are subject to enhancement and degradation in light of 
a wide range of factors, including the situations in which agents act and the 
cultural scripts or narratives that structure how agents understand and respond 
to the situations they are in.
6. Norms, and how it all fits together
As I noted above, the comparatively thin content of our judgments of 
blameworthiness appeal to some ideas (i.e., that there is a special kind of agent 
involved, that there was a violation of some particular kind of norm) that require 
a theory of what these things could be. I’ve given the outlines of an account 
about the relevant form of agency, but we still need a story about the norms of 
blame. What gives content to these norms? What makes these norms—whatever 
they are—the right ones? To answer this question I need to introduce two ideas 
that can initially seem a little bizarre, but that do some important work in the 
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business of theory building. The first is the notion of an ideal observer.
 An ideal observer is just that— an observer that is, in some relevant respect, 
ideal. The ideal observer is a theoretical construction that helps us wrap our 
heads around what properties or characteristics are of relevant interest. So, for 
example, suppose you are given the task of saying what constitutes an excellent 
philosophy talk for a particularly diverse audience of laypersons and scholars. 
Given the range of expertise in the audience, it might be very difficult or seemingly 
impossible to say how that talk should go, beyond platitudes about being engaging 
and informative and accessible. But we could also say that the best talk to give 
would be one that an ideal observer, aware of everyone’s interests and tolerances 
would recommend to the speaker, given the speaker’s aims. Now this reply isn’t 
going to directly settle the matter of which talk you should give. But it might 
help you characterize what sorts of things would make a good talk because it gives 
you a standpoint from which to think about which features of a talk matter or 
don’t. And, it might illuminate how some of those things could fund the truth 
or falsity of claims about what would be a good or bad talk to give.
 Now consider the case of norms of praising and blaming. What determines 
which norms are the ones that we properly bring to bear on responsible agents? 
There are, after all, lots of ways we can describe how norms of when and how to 
praise and blame might go. As a first pass, we can say that the right norms are 
the norms that an ideal observer would select for responsible agents. As stated, 
this is clearly inadequate. We need to know what sorts of things would drive 
the selection of norms picked out by our ideal observer. But here our story of 
responsible agency can help us out.
 Recall that a distinctive feature of responsibility ascriptions is that they target 
certain kinds of agents and not others. Now, we can say exactly what kind of 
agent it is that we are targeting and why: we’re interested in that special class of 
agents that can recognize and respond to moral reasons precisely because that 
is what moral responsibility is about. That is, moral responsibility is about our 
relationship to how well or poorly we are tracking what moral reasons there are. 
So, when we think about what sorts of praising and blaming norms an ideal 
observer would be selecting for creatures like us, the most promising answer 
seems to be norms that are, in some central way, tied to the fact of our being 
creatures that can recognize and respond to moral reasons. So, what we need is 
some way of tying the kind of agency at stake in responsibility claims to a set of 
norms that are relevant.
 We have now arrived at the second idea of what generates the particular 
content of the responsibility norms: indirect consequentialist justification. The 
idea is that what the norms of blameworthiness will be is that collection of 
norms that, if internalized by agents of the relevant sort, would be the ones that 
in fact, over time, do the job of getting agents to better recognize and respond to 
13
Vargas: Responsibility in a World of Causes
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2010
Responsibility In a World of Causes  69
what moral reasons there are. Or, to put the point a bit differently, what justify 
our web of responsibility-characteristic practices, attitudes, and judgments are, 
roughly, the effects of such a system on creatures like us, over time. That is, these 
practices foster in agents like us those remarkable capacities for recognizing and 
appropriately responding to moral reasons. Consequently, the correctness of 
judgments of responsibility are settled by those facts, i.e., the facts about the 
package of norms an ideal observer would select for us, given various facts about 
our internalizing the norms and acting on them, and given the observer’s aim 
of selecting a package of norms that effectively cultivates in us moral reasons-
responsive agency.
 We don’t want to fall into the bad old trap of supposing that the 
blameworthiness norms require that we always attempt to influence each other 
in some special way, or that they require that we suppose that someone only 
counts as blameworthy if they are susceptible to blame. The indirect part of 
the consequentialist justification is important because it buys us considerable 
flexibility in what the content of the responsibility norms can look like. Particular 
first-order norms (e.g.: praise people for selflessness, blame people for duplicitous 
infidelity, etc.) need not make any appeal to consequences at all, whether in 
the specific or general case. Indeed, it is quite plausible to think that the best 
and most effective set of norms will include many that are exclusively backward 
looking. This is compatible with the account; we only appeal to consequences 
at the level of the effects of having a diverse set of internalized norms, many of 
which make no appeal to the consequences.
 So, to sum up the picture, to judge that some person X is responsible for some 
action A is to judge that X is an agent of the right sort—a responsible agent—and 
thus subject to a distinctive set of norms concerning responses to X’s violation, 
meeting, or exceeding some moral norms. The structure of the blaming norms 
is connected to what is distinctive about responsible agency, namely, the capacity 
to respond appropriately to moral reasons. And, we can think of the particular 
details of those norms as being settled by the ideal observer with full information 
about how implementation of various sets of possible blaming norms might go. 
That is, the norms are those such an observer would select for the collection 
of agents, given the aim of fostering reasons-responsive agency, and the aim of 
enhancing that sensitivity across contexts of action. Or, we might just say that moral 
responsibility is about building better beings.
 There is, of course, a lot more to say about each of these pieces and about 
all the details. Nailing down philosophical details is a painstaking task, and 
some of the details I’ve glossed over are particularly painful. Still, we’re now in 
a position to see how some pieces might hang together. Earlier, I claimed that 
moral responsibility is really about our relationship to how well or poorly we 
are tracking what moral reasons there are. Now we can see what that comes to, 
14
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for we have some account of what responsibility consists in, and why it should 
matter. I began by suggesting that the work of the concept of moral responsibility 
is to mark differential assessments of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. A 
theory that explains how we might do that (i.e., how we might rightly mark these 
distinctions in the world and on what basis) has claim on being a philosophical 
(normative, prescriptive) theory of moral responsibility. Different accounts of this, 
however, will come with better and worse resources for explaining the point of 
keeping track of moral responsibility, or the point of retaining the concept in the 
face of calls to jettison it. On the account I have offered, the point of recognizing 
and responding to distinctions in praiseworthiness and blameworthiness is the 
cultivation of a special form of agency, one that is sensitive to moral considerations. 
To the extent to which we care about morality and our relationship to it, we have 
an investment in our being better agents of the sort that our practices, attitudes, 
and judgments of responsibility are properly organized around cultivating. So, it 
seems, we can explain the importance and basic structure of moral responsibility 
in terms that do not appeal to spooky powers or features of agency we otherwise 
have reason to doubt.
7. Breaking the chain
What does all of this mean for the familiar chain of reasoning with which we 
started?
 Notice that the account of responsibility I have offered is fully compatible 
with any standard story about the details of the causal order. We can be fully 
caused, even deterministically caused, and still morally responsible. I do not 
claim to have captured our ordinary conception of what is required for moral 
responsibility. Perhaps it is true that we typically suppose that moral responsibility 
requires powers that are incompatible with a broadly scientific conception of 
human beings. Nevertheless, what I have offered is an account of the work of the 
concept, and how that work can be done without appeal to anything other than 
features of agency that we plausibly have. My claim is that regardless of whether 
the world is deterministic or even just fully causally ordered, we can make sense of 
the underpinnings of moral responsibility and the kinds of capacities it requires.15
 What this means for the rest of the familiar chain of reasoning is not clear. 
If you thought that free will was something like the self-governance or control 
condition on moral responsibility, then it looks like this account shows how 
you can have that regardless of whether or not larger-than-nano-sized objects 
are mostly deterministic in their operations. Second, the account also seems to 
block some standard worries about the idea that human agency is reducible to 
lower level properties, whether they be brain states or something else. On this 
account, there might well be a fully adequate reduction of all interesting features 
15
Vargas: Responsibility in a World of Causes
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2010
Responsibility In a World of Causes  71
of agency. Nevertheless, what the account points to are those features of agents 
that, reducible or not, properly drive responsibility ascriptions. So, again, the 
account shows how the business of judging and holding one another responsible is 
insulated from worries that this part of our self-image will be undone by a broadly 
materialistic or physicalist account of persons. My hope is that by showing that 
responsibility can stand on its own feet, the familiar chain of reasoning will seem 
a good deal less threatening. At the very least, we will have made some trouble 
for those who would gruffly conclude that a consequence of modern science is 
that things like blameworthiness are illusory, or at best, useful fictions.16
8. Extending the picture
Before concluding, I’d like to briefly draw out some of the implications of this 
account of responsibility. In particular, I’ll say a bit about what this account 
tells us about children, psychopaths, and responsibility under various forms of 
mental illness.
 Children raise some interesting questions for a theory of moral responsibility. 
Intuitively, young children are paradigm instances of agents that cannot be morally 
responsible. Somehow, though, they come to be fully responsible agents by the 
time they are adults. A theory of responsibility should be able to say something 
about that change. It is notable how much of childrearing we direct at socializing 
children to be sensitive to moral norms. But for all that, much of it is feigned, 
at least at first. That is, we might praise and blame children to help inculcate in 
them the various responsibility norms, but in doing so we need not really think 
that children are ubiquitously responsible. Still, at least sometimes, we really 
do seem to hold our children responsible. I remember being caught by surprise 
at how much anger and disappointment I felt when one of my older kids was 
particularly cruel to her comparatively defenseless and guileless baby sister; and, at 
least in talking with other parents, this sense of outrage is not as rare as we would 
like. What this points to, though, is an interesting feature of how responsible 
agency can, in some important sense, grow over time. That is, we can never rightly 
think of very young agents—infants—as sensitive to moral considerations. It takes 
time before they are able to recognize what we think of as moral considerations. 
And, even when it does happen, it is usually in a piecemeal fashion, limited to 
particular contexts. But, in those contexts we have a genuinely responsible agent. 
 So, we can explain why—in some comparatively limited cases—it makes sense 
to hold children responsible, and why, in other cases, it does not. The capacity 
for moral responsibility is not some unified, global, cross-situationally stable 
capacity that is either had or not. Over time, though, the pattern of feigned 
praising and blaming ordinarily helps such agents expand their sensitivity to 
moral considerations, or, at least, those considerations regarded as moral in that 
16
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society.
 Psychopaths are another intriguing limit case for a theory of moral responsibility. 
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all the interesting 
empirical and conceptual aspects of this category, including some very interesting 
issues about what constitutes psychopathy—for example, the category is not in 
the DSM, and among its earliest predecessors was a category with the suggestive 
label of “moral idiocy.” But, on one plausible construal of the category, two of 
the most salient features of psychopaths include: (1) the inability to distinguish 
between what psychologists call conventional and moral harms, and relatedly, 
(2) diminished emotional responses to witnessing harm. There is some evidence 
that a robust range of moral concepts cannot be acquired without our typical 
reactions to witnessing harm and injury. Without the resulting moral concepts, it 
looks like there is no way to satisfy the detection condition on responsible agency. 
If all of this is right—although matters are complicated—then in domains where 
psychopaths are constitutionally incapable of perceiving moral considerations of 
the relevant sort, we cannot rightly regard them as responsible agents, and thus, 
as properly subject to judgments that they deserve moral praise and blame.
 There are several complicating factors here, though. First, it is not clear that 
the psychopath’s inability to recognize a wide range of moral considerations 
constitutes a uniform excuse from all aspects of responsibility. For example, it 
might be possible for the psychopath to recognize moral considerations of some 
restricted sort, or to recognize considerations that overlap with, for example, 
considerations of prudence or self-interest. If so, then the matter of whether or not 
a psychopath is properly evaluated in terms of the responsibility norms becomes, 
as in the case of children, a matter of partial or intermittent suitability. Second, 
it is unclear whether there are non-standard ways to bootstrap psychopaths up 
into something like conventional moral cognition. That is, even if the underlying 
features that give rise to psychopathy preclude the ordinary route to acquiring 
moral concepts, it is unclear whether there are non-standard routes to acquiring 
moral concepts, or reasonable analogs of them.17
 One notable implication of the theory is that agents can have relatively 
isolated deficiencies that undermine responsibility in some contexts but not 
others. There are two take home points that follow from this last bit.
 First, when we think about the possibility of responsible agency under 
conditions of severe forms of mental illness, we shouldn’t suppose that what is 
at stake is some sweeping exculpation or sweeping judgment of responsibility. 
The cognitive and affective impairments of various pathologies can intersect 
with the demands of moral responsibility in different and variable ways. So, 
schizophrenia will, perhaps sometimes, incapacitate one to a degree sufficient 
to undermine responsibility. Even when delusional, however, the schizophrenic 
is not necessarily immune to the possibility of recognizing and responding to 
17
Vargas: Responsibility in a World of Causes
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2010
Responsibility In a World of Causes  73
moral considerations. This is not to deny that in plenty of cases, the symptoms 
of mental illnesses of various sorts will make sufficient havoc of the machinery 
of responsible agency. But the when and the how of the impacts of mental illness 
are not uniform across cases or across circumstances of action.
 The second take home lesson about the context specificity of deficiencies in 
responsibility is that there remain deep and difficult questions surrounding the 
extent to which we can shape our environments to facilitate the building of better 
beings. One idea that is at least as old as Aristotle is the idea of a degree of path-
dependence in moral cognition. That is, one acquires the ability to recognize and 
apply particular moral concepts only if one had particular experiences. There is a 
growing body of research in social psychology that suggests something like this for 
a variety of concepts, including honor and respect. If some moral and quasi-moral 
notions work this way, then we should wonder what sorts of environments foster 
sensitivity to what moral considerations, and whether there is anything we can do 
to shape the paths upon which our moral notions depend. However, even if there 
is no interesting story to be told about the path-dependence of moral cognition, 
there are numerous, well documented ways that situational forces enhance the 
frequency with which we engage in helping behavior, suppress our prejudices, 
and come to successfully act on the reasons we consciously recognize. But this 
also means that there are situational forces of which we are usually unaware that 
degrade our agency.
 Navigating these waters is the next step, and deciding whether and how to shape 
our social world will be difficult. But self-creation has never been an easy task.18
  University of San Francisco
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Notes
1 Helpful discussions of the early roots of this chain of reasoning can be found 
in Susanne Bobzien, “The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-
Will Problem,” Phronesis 43 (1988): 132-75; Richard Sorabji, “The Concept of 
the Will From Plato to Maximus the Confessor,” in The Will, ed. Thomas Pink, 
and Martin Stone (London: Routledge, 2003).
2 John A. Bargh, “Free Will is Un-Natural,” in Are We Free? Psychology and Free 
Will, ed. John Baer et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); P. Read 
Montague, “Free Will,” Current Biology 18, no. 14 (2008): R584-R585; Susan 
Pockett, “The Concept of Free Will: Philosophy Neuroscience, and the Law,” 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 25 (2007): 281-93; Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion 
of Conscious Will (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
3  Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2001).
4  I also suspect there is a kind of mind attracted to hard, outlier conclusions. 
The urge to stand apart (to be rebellious, to be intellectually “tough”) is no less 
a posture in the professor than in the teenager.
5  In fact, I reject almost every aspect of the chain of argument, as it is 
presented. Here, though, my focus is restricted to blocking its implications for 
moral responsibility.
6  See P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British 
Academy XLVIII (1962): 1-25.
7  A further difficulty: the conceptual role itself could be ill-advised or 
incoherent. Something like this seems to have often been the case with the 
history of scientific concepts. A category arises to explain a variety of different 
phenomena, and it turns out that this explanatory role for which the concept 
was generated does not exist in that fashion.
8  Let us assume we have an account of right and wrong action. For the 
consequentialists of the time, this was frequently understood to mean action 
that increased or decreased utility.
9  Kuru was a disease afflicting the brain that came to international attention 
in the 1950s because of an outbreak in Papua New Guinea; one acquired it 
by eating dead humans, especially their brain and nervous system. It became 
extinct within a generation of Australia’s 1957 ban of cannibalism.
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10 One could have a view on which, given the existence of an afterlife, it is 
a somewhat common and ordinary thing to influence the dead with, say, 
prayers of petition. But I put this possibility to the side precisely because it does 
not seem plausible to think that the ordinary case of making a responsibility 
judgment about the dead requires such a possibility. Even less interestingly, one 
might think that one can influence the dead by changing relational properties 
that include the dead as one of the relata. My grandparents can be made more 
genetically successful by my procreative endeavors, and in this way, I might be 
said to exert some influence on them, even in death. But this sort of influence 
does not seem relevant or even required in the case of ordinary judgments of 
praise and blame.
11 The point here is that we can have a set of conceptual or connotative content 
that is distinct from the oftentimes trickier matter of identifying the property or 
constituent properties referred to in uses of the concept.
12 There are a number of philosophers who have done important work regarding 
what reasons responsiveness comes to. In what follows, I will not attempt to 
note each of my intellectual debts and the various points on which my account 
departs from those who have influenced me. Instead, I will simply note that 
in thinking about reasons responsiveness, I take myself to have learned a good 
deal from the work of John Martin Fischer, R. Jay Wallace, and Nomy Arpaly, 
among others.
13 Here I’m cheating a bit. There is a lively philosophical disputation concerning 
how we should understand capacity talk, and in particular, the capacities of 
agents in the context of praise and blame. In the text, I am helping myself to 
the idea that there is a notion of capacity in ordinary language that entails 
that even if our capacities are stable in lots of ordinary contexts, that same 
capacity changes under specific conditions. Unsurprisingly, I think that there 
is a philosophically respectable way of cashing out this basic idea, although in 
the text above I take myself to just be relying on the intuitiveness of natural 
language use. The substantive philosophical account I prefer depends on the 
idea that the capacities we are properly interested in when thinking about 
responsibility will be somewhat general or coarse-grained, not appealing to the 
precise circumstances of actual action given the actual past and actual laws of 
nature. Since this species of capacity talk is, on my view, dependent on our 
practical interests, it permits this phenomenon (above) where the general 
powers we focus on do not neatly track our motivational variations. One could 
think, instead, that our capacities are best understood in a fine-grained way, 
tracking actual motivational variation (so, for example, we just have “capacity 
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to resist temptation when my brother is in the room” and “capacity to resist 
temptation when my brother is not in the room”). I think there are reasons 
to disfavor this fine-grained approach to capacity talk, which hinge on the 
complexity of making the presumably vast number of micro-capacities salient in 
ordinary deliberation and collective social organization of practices. However, 
characterizing the generality I think is appropriate, motivating its viability as 
an account of capacity, and explaining how it maps on to ordinary practices of 
deliberation about responsibility are some the challenges that arise for the more 
coarse-grained account I favor. See my “Situationism and Moral Responsibility: 
Will in Fragments” (forthcoming).
14  What other things? Well, whether the agent did something good or bad. 
And, for example, what the norms of blameworthiness say we ought to do in 
light of the agent having done that good or bad thing in that context. More on 
this latter idea in a moment.
15  I don’t pretend to have here offered an account of what the relevant 
capacities come to. Call a particularly demanding notion of capacity a “Garden 
of Forking Paths” picture of capacity—one where we hold fixed facts about the 
actual past and actual laws of nature, and ask what is possible holding fixed those 
starting conditions. I do not think this is the sense of capacity required for moral 
responsibility. Instead, I think much looser conditions will hold, akin to those 
that hold when we truly say that someone has the capacity to speak Spanish (even 
though he or she may be speaking in English at the moment). On this picture, our 
capacities are fixed partly by our practical purposes in ascribing those capacities. 
So, on the present approach, the relevant notion of capacity will be partly given by 
the notion of capacity that would be required to effectively cultivate moral reasons 
responsiveness. For more on this matter, see note 13.
16  This is not to suggest that I take my account to be immune to empirical 
disconfirmation. On the contrary, I think that (for example) were someone 
to show that even the best system of praising and blaming over time corroded 
moral reasons responsive agency or gradually constricted the range of contexts 
in which we had such agency, then this would be grounds for rejecting the 
theory. Thanks to Gordon Barnes for raising this issue.
17  There is some evidence that in very rare cases people with antisocial 
personality disorder (a category that imperfectly overlaps with the psychopathy 
diagnosis) can “snap out of it” or begin to live more conventional lives, usually 
in mid-life. Also, we might wonder whether and how differences in social 
context and social networks can affect the ability of at least some psychopaths 
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to compensate for the characteristic emotional impairments. Finally, there is 
the matter of whether some of the cognitive strategies adopted by autistics for 
navigating moral norms might be transferred to the psychopathic case. My own 
sense, though, is that we are unlikely to find that there are many—if any—cases 
where psychopaths are non-accidentally sensitive to moral considerations.
18 Thanks to the material support and hospitable environs of the Radcliffe Institute 
for Advanced Study and the Stanford Center for Ethics in Society, where I worked 
on this paper. Thanks too, to Kristin Drake, Heather Fox, and audiences at the 
Radcliffe Institute for Advance Study, the College at Brockport, and Sacramento 
State University, for feedback on earlier incarnations of this paper.
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